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 The board has the responsibility to monitor, discipline, and remove  
ineffective management teams, and to ensure that managers pursue the 
interests of shareholders. The Bonn Resolution noted that TVET is the 
master key for alleviation of poverty, promotion of peace, creation of 
employment, food security and conservation of the environment, in order to 
improve the quality of Human Life and promote sustainable development. 
However, Kenya has continued to experience challenges of unemployment, 
poverty, food insecurity and environmental degradation. Although the 
structure of the board  is very important for the success of an organization, 
the effect of structure of the board  on performance of TVET Institutions is 
not clear.  Prior studies show mixed relationships between structure of the 
board and performance. The main objective of this study was  to establish the 
effect of the structure of the board  on performance of public TVET 
institutions in Nyanza region, Kenya. The design used  was correlation 
research design.   Population of the study included the principals, deputy 
principals and heads of department of TVET Institutions in Nyanza region 
Kenya who were 99 in number.  The study employed a census survey with 
response at 97.5 %.  Reliability was measured using cronchbach’s alpha 
which revealed 0.872 consistency.  Regarding the size of the coefficient, the 




study found that as the variable changes by 1 unit, performance too changes 
by a magnitude of 0.125.  The results however  showed that the probability 
of structure of the board  is  insignificant (p values = 0.164)  at 5% level in 
determining performance. The study concludes that performance of TVET 
Institutions is determined by several factors which vary in their magnitude of 
influence. This study recommends that stakeholders employ the principles of 
corporate governance in appointing boards of management since they impact 
on performance positively.  Findings of this study may be used for decision 
making by policy makers to improve governance of TVET Institutions and 
other stakeholders for further research. 
 




The structure of the board for value addition represents a difficult 
balance between diversity of views and skills, the size, and director 
competency. According to Raheja (2005) the smaller the board, the more 
likely that it will be able to perform its functions comprehensively, 
particularly as they relate to management. The larger the board, the more 
diverse its membership will be, but the less likely it will be to reach clear 
decisions quickly. While much attention has focused on the issue of optimal 
board size there is no consensus about what the actual ideal size it should 
have. Empirical evidence (Kiel and Nicholson 2003; Leblanc and Gillies 
2004) on the relationship between structure of the board and performance, 
point out that results are mixed and inconclusive. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) 
suggest that there is an “inverted U” relationship between board size and 
performance in which adding directors can bring the board to optimal skills 
and experience mix level and hence improve performance. A comparative 
study of Australian and Japanese firms found that the conventionally large 
size of Japanese boards did correlate with poorer performance. However, 
board size in the Australian context, where boards are conventionally 
smaller, did not show an influence on firm performance (Bonn et al. 2004).  
 
Structure of the Board for Value Addition and Performance 
College Board members have a critical responsibility to direct the 
institution toward achieving its mission. As a trustee one has an opportunity 
to contribute their talent, expertise and dedication to a worthy cause. A 
trustee has to remain focused on providing good stewardship of the 
institutions mission reputation and resources (Grant, 2009). Paul (2008), 
further states that governing bodies of higher institutions are responsible for 
personnel decisions, institutional operation and corporate governance. Like 
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coordinating boards, they plan and budget for the institutions subject to 
ultimate decisions by the government. According to Raheja (2005) the size 
of a board represents a difficult balance between diversity of views and 
skills, and the board’s functional effectiveness. The smaller the board, the 
more likely that it will be able to perform its functions comprehensively 
particularly as they relate to management. The larger the board, the more 
diverse its membership will be, but the less likely it will be to reach clear 
decisions quickly. Larger boards typically rely on the committees to work 
through issues and to report to the full board, (Boone, et al 2007).While 
much attention has focused on the issue of optimal board size there is no 
consensus about what the actual ideal size it should have. In Australia 
according to the ASX (2010), it is proposed that a not-too-large board will 
help in efficient decision-making by minimizing negative board dynamics. 
The ASX recommends, for example, that board size be limited so as to 
encourage efficient decision-making. Eight directors are cited as the upper 
limit and 6.6 as the mean board size in a study by Kiel and Nicholson 2003. 
In another study, eight is described as “typical” (Larckeret al., 2004), while 
Leblanc and Gillies (2004) note that eight to eleven is viewed as optimal. 
Uhrig (2003) reports that six to nine is current good practice in the private 
sector but goes on to suggest that optimal board size in the public sector may 
differ from one organization to another. In summary, as Leblanc and Gillies 
(2004) point out, the board needs individuals with a strong commitment to 
the fundamental purpose and mission of the institution. Boards should 
consider performing an annual inventory of talent to assess whether the right 
professional capabilities are represented on the board. The board should also 
include individuals with the specific skills and know-how needed to examine 
issues through multiple lenses: legal, financial, public relations, 
communications, management, and professional development, among others. 
In conclusion, the board must be attentive to its internal processes, so that its 
meetings focus only on board-level matters and do so in a way that draws 
upon the combined knowledge and experience (Higher education board 
member handbook 2009). 
 In Europe, the two most important functions of the board of directors 
are those of advising and monitoring (Raheja, 2005). According to Adams 
and Ferriera, (2007) the advisory function involves the provision of expert 
advice to the CEO and access to critical information and resources. This is 
performed by both insiders and outsiders. Although Fama and Jensen (1983) 
note the importance of outside directors, who bring valuable expertise and 
potentially important connections, the advantage of larger board size is the 
greater collective information that the board subsequently possesses and 
hence larger boards will lead to higher performance (Dalton et al., 2005). 
Secondly, the board has the responsibility to monitor, discipline, and remove 




ineffective management teams, to ensure that managers pursue the interests 
of shareholders. 
 Raheja (2005) argues that insiders are an important source of firm-
specific information for the board, but may have distorted objectives due to 
private benefits and lack of independence from the CEO. Compared to 
insiders, outsiders are more independent, providing better monitoring, but are 
less informed about the firm’s activities. Again, the advantage of larger 
board size and an increasing number of nonexecutive directors is the greater 
collective information possessed by the board which is also valuable for the 
monitoring function (Lehn et al., 2004). Therefore, both functions predict an 
initial improvement in board performance as board size increases; since 
increases in the number of non-executives are expected to have a more 
positive impact than increases in the number of executive directors. 
However, there are eventually disadvantages of large boards in the form of 
coordination costs and free rider problems. Firstly, coordination and 
communication problems arise because it is more difficult to arrange board 
meetings, reach consensus, leading to slower and less-efficient decision-
making (Jensen 1993). Secondly, board cohesiveness is undermined because 
board members will be less likely to share a common purpose, communicate 
with each other clearly, and reach a consensus that builds on the directors’ 
different points of view (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Thirdly, director free-
riding increases because the cost to any individual director of not exercising 
diligence falls in proportion to board size (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992). Jensen 
(1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that as board size increases 
beyond a certain point, these inefficiencies outweigh the initial advantages 
from having more directors to draw on, leading to a lower level of corporate 
performance.  
 Psaros and Seamer (2002) explain that board independence is critical 
to ensuring that the Board of Directors fulfills its objective oversight role and 
holds management accountable to shareholders. Agency theory underlies this 
rationale. Ensuring a majority of independent directors (outsiders) on the 
board will counterbalance the power of the CEO in decision-making and 
provide assurance to shareholders. Of course, in theory, all directors should 
exercise independent judgment in decision-making. Psaros and Seamer 
(2002) explain that independence should not be equated with non-executive. 
As they point out, “some non-executive directors are independent, others are 
not”.  An independent outsider will not only be non-executive – that is, not 
on the existing management team – but also independent in other ways. 
These include:  Not a former employer; not a major shareholder; not holding 
a significant contractual, supplier or advisory relationship with the company; 
does not have any other significant interest in the company, which could 
negatively impact on the director’s ability to act in the interests of the 
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company. An Independent board is one of the effective mechanisms in 
monitoring the accounting process (Klein 2002). Similarly, Gilson (2006) 
argues that the independence of directors are complementary developments. 
However, independence is equally intended to operate not just as a conduit, 
but also as a counterbalance to shareholder demands as a more enlightened 
version of the shareholder value approach. Coleman (2007) concluded that 
the direction and extent of impact of governance is dependent on the 
performance measure being examined. According to Hay group (2003), 
competencies are skills knowledge and behaviours that lead to performance. 
They further define competency as an underlying characteristic of a person 
which enables them deliver superior performance in a given job. In 
distinguishing competencies it’s important to distinguish between the major 
categories. Threshold competencies are the characteristics that any major job 
holder needs to have to do the job effectively but that do not distinguish the 
average from the superior performer. Whereas differentiating competencies 
are characteristics that superior performers have but the average person 
lacks. An evaluation of the range of skills, experiences, and expertise of the 
board is therefore beneficial before a candidate is recommended for 
appointment. The Cadbury report (1992) emphasizes that non-executive 
directors’ competency is an important factor for the board to be effective. 
Among others, directors should have knowledge on managing company and 
corporate governance processes (Chtourou et al., 2001). Managers without 
appropriate competency in accounting and finance field may be able to 
monitor business processes but they may not be able to understand 
management practices (Xie et al., 2003). 
 
2.4 Empirical Studies on Structure of the board for Value Addition to 
Performance 
 It is worth noting that, as Kiel and Nicholson (2003), point out; from 
an agency perspective that it could be argued that a large board is better. The 
rather unconvincing logic is that the more people monitoring management 
action the better. They also note a possible positive relationship between 
large boards and the capacity of the board to harness external links and 
attract external resources to the organization. The authors draw a number of 
distinctions between the United States Context and the Norwegian context, 
for example US firms and Norwegian firms operate within different legal 
regimes.  A comparative study of Australian and Japanese firms found that 
the conventionally large size of Japanese boards did correlate with poorer 
performance. However, board size in the Australian context, where boards 
are conventionally smaller, did not show an influence on firm performance 
(Bonn et al., 2004). 




 Ghabayen (2012) who assessed the relationship between board 
mechanisms (audit committee size, audit committee composition, board size, 
and board composition) and firm performance had data collected from a 
sample of 102 non-financial listed companies. Regression analysis was 
utilized to examine the relationship between board characteristics and firm 
performance. The study reports that audit committee size, audit committee 
composition and board size have no effect on firm performance in the 
selected sample while board composition has a significant negative 
relationship with firm performance. 
 A study by Wei Wu (2009) examines the correlation between board 
composition and firm performance of Chinese listed companies. The sample 
is composed by Chinese local companies listed on Shanghai Stock 
Exchange. The sample includes companies from the manufacturing industry, 
other service industries and financial service industry. A quantitative 
approach was adopted to examine the correlation between board composition 
and firm performance for listed companies. Some other determinants that 
may have an impact on firm performance are also examined, such as the 
correlation between firm performance and ownership structure, firm 
performance and board size. Tobin’s Q was used to measure performance 
while regression analysis model was used to analyze data.  The results reveal 
no significant associations between the proportion of independent directors 
in the board and firm performance. But the ownership structure has some 
association with firm performance.  The study findings indicate that a firm 
with higher concentrated ownership structure has a tendency to have a better 
firm performance and a negative correlation between board size and firm 
performance is found. 
 Although literature is provided between structure of the board and 
performance, the findings are inconclusive and knowledge of structure of the 
board and performance of TVET Institutions is still lacking. A study should 
therefore be conducted to determine the relationship between structure of the 
board and performance of public TVET Institutions in Nyanza region, 
Kenya. This may in turn help in shading light on the influence of corporate 
governance on performance of TVET Institution Nyanza region, Kenya. 
 
3.1 Required Data Input 
 The relationship between structure of the board and performance of 
public TVET Institutions was assessed using a Pearson’s correlation analysis 
at 5% level of significance. A negative correlation was interpreted to mean 
that there is an inverse relationship between structure of the board and 
performance of public TVET Institutions i.e. as the board structure improves 
the performance of the TVET institution decrease.  
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4.1 Findings on the Relationship between Structure of the Board and 
Performance of Public TVET Institutions in Nyanza Region, Kenya. 
 The  research objective was to determine the relationship between 
structure of the board and performance of public TVET Institutions in 
Nyanza region, Kenya. To establish this relationship, the researcher 
developed a questionnaire designed to determine the structure of the board 
for value addition. The scores on the structure of the board questionnaire 
were related to scores on performance of public TVET institutions 
questionnaire.  
 
4.1.1 Structure of the Board for Value Addition 
 In exploring the structure of the board constructs, a questionnaire 
used had items drawn linked to concepts which were regarded as important 
components of the structure of the board for value addition measurements. 
The questionnaire was to investigate on; the balanced mix of the board, 
whether the roles of the chairperson of the board and chief executive officer 
were separated, whether the appointed committees had a defined term of 
reference, whether the committees had been established and appointed in the 
light of the need to increase the effectiveness of the board, whether the board 
had  established and appointed  various committees and lastly, whether the 
terms of reference of each committee were restricted and defined. The items 
were Likert-scaled statements in which the respondents choose from 5-point 
score; strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree and strongly disagree.  
The descriptive statistics on responses on board of structure were 
computed and presented in Table 4.1. 
Source: Survey Data (2015) 
 
 Table 4.1 indicates that the corporate governance is enhanced more 
when the board has established and appointed an executive committee, an 
audit committee, and a remuneration committee. This was reflected by high 
mean posted by this item (mean=2.51, standard deviation=1.173 and 
standard error =.124). This implies that most of the respondents believed that 
a board with relevant committees has appropriate competencies to enable it 
discharge its mandate effectively. On the other hand, the item with least 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics Structure of Board 
 N Mean Std. Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 
Balanced mix 90 2.09 .109 1.035 
Power separation 90 2.00 .101 .960 
Defined terms committee 90 2.28 .124 1.181 
Increased effectiveness 90 2.19 .080 .763 
Appointed committee 90 2.38 .102 .967 
Restricted terms of reference 90 2.51 .124 1.173 




mean was whether the roles of chairperson of board and chief executive 
officer were separated and held by different persons, at mean=2.00, standard 
deviation =. 960 and standard error =.101.  
 
4.4.2: Frequency Responses on the Structure of Board 
 The responses were computed into frequency percentages as reflected 
in Table 4.8. 





Agree Undecided Disagree strongly 
disagree 
Balanced  mix of the board 29 (32.2) 37 (41.1) 13 (15.4) 9 (10.0) 2 (2.2) 
Role  separation 25 (27.8) 51(56.7) 8 (8.9) 1 (1.1) 5 (5.6) 
Committee’s terms of reference  28 (31.1) 30 (33.3) 15 (16.7) 13 (14.4) 4 (4.4) 
Need to increase  effectiveness 15 (16.7) 47(52.2) 24(26.7) 4(4.4) 0(0.0) 
Appointed  committees 12 (13.3) 46(51.1) 23(25.6) 4(4.4) 5(5.6) 
Committees  terms of reference 16 (17.8) 36(40.0) 24(26.7) 5(4.4) 10(11.1) 
Source: Survey Data (2014) 
4.4.2.1 Balance Mix of Board 
 The findings of study show that nearly three quarters (strongly 
agree:32.2%; agree:41.1%) of the respondents alluded that within their 
institutions there was indeed a balance mix executive, non-executive as well 
as independent non-executive directors. However, 10.0% and 2.2% of them 
disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively that there was any evident of 
reasonable balance mix in their institutions and another 15.4% of the 
respondents remained non-committal on whether their institutions embraced 
balance of mix of executive, non-executive and independent non-executive 
directors in the management board. This finding are in line with Leblanc and 
Gillies (2004) who point out that the board should also include individuals 
with the specific skills and know-how needed to examine issues through 
multiple lenses: legal, financial, public relations, communications, 
management, and professional development, among others. The findings are 
also in line with the Managerial Hegemony theory which suggests that board 
members should have professional knowledge so as to influence key power 
sources such as information and other organizational decisions.   
 
4.4.2.2 Separation of Roles 
 On whether there was a clear separation of roles of chairperson of the 
board and chief executive officers, it was evident from the findings of the 
study that most TVET institutions in Nyanza region practiced separation of 
roles in their top management. Table 4.4 indicated that although 6.7% of the 
respondents refuted the assertion that there was separation of roles of the 
board chairperson and chief executive officers in their institutions, more than 
a quarter (27.8%) of the respondents strongly agreed and another 56.7% 
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agreed that it was evident that role separation existed among the top 
management in their institutions. However, 8.9% of the participants of the 
study were not sure whether or not roles of chairperson of the board and 
chief executive officer was separate and held by different people, hence they 
remained undecided.    
 
4.4.2.3 Committees’ Terms of Reference 
 It emerged from the findings of the study that most TVET institutions 
had committees that were appointed formally with clear defined terms of 
reference. Nearly two thirds (strongly agree: 31.1%; agree: 33.3%) of the 
respondents were in agreement that their institutions’ board had formally 
established and appointed committees with defined terms of reference, 
composition and reporting requirements. This finding is in line with the 
argument   Raheja (2005) who point out that boards should typically rely on 
committees to work through issues and to report to the full board. The 
respondents who were undecided on the matter formed 16.7% of study 
participants’. However, 18.8% of them held the opinion that their boards did 
not keenly observe such formality.  
 
4.4.2.4 Need to Increase Effectiveness  
 On the need to increase effectiveness of the board, the findings of the 
study show that despite a significant proportion (26.7%) of the respondents 
not being sure whether their boards had consciously established their 
committees with a view of increasing their effectiveness, quite a reasonable 
proportion of the respondents agree that their boards do that. More than two 
thirds (68.9%) of the respondents generally accepted that the committees in 
their institutions were established and appointed in light of the need to 
increase the effectiveness of the Board by utilizing the specialized skills of 
board members, to provide support and guidance to management, to ensure 
effective and independent professional consideration of issues e.g. audit 
reports and finance issues, among others. Only a near negligible proportion 
(4.4%) of the respondents refuted the claim that their committees had been 
established and appointed in light of increasing effectiveness of boards. 
 
4.4.2.5 Appointed Committees 
 The findings of the study show that many of the management boards 
had put in place various committees to handle specific issues of the 
organization that arise in daily operations. For example, the analysis of the 
respondents responses indicate that more than half (51.1%) of the 
respondents agreed and 13.3% strongly agreed that there was appointment of 
committees such as an executive committee, audit committee, and 
appointment and remuneration committee in their institutions. Whereas those 




who were in disagreement (4.4% disagreed and 5.6% strongly disagreed) 
with that statement formed a tenth of the respondents, slightly more than a 
quarter (25.6%) of the respondents remained undecided on the matter. 
 
4.4.2.6 Committees Terms of Reference 
 On whether terms of reference for each committee were restricted 
and defined, more than half of the respondents generally accepted that 
assertion. Those who strongly agreed were 17.8% and those who just agreed 
formed 40.0% of the respondents. However, more than a quarter (26.7%) of 
the respondents remained undecided on the matter, as the other 15.5% (4.4% 
disagreed and 11.1% strongly disagreed) of them differed with the rest of the 
respondents. 
 
4.4.3: Hypothesis Testing of the Objective  
 To answer the research objective, the researcher tested the 
hypothesis, “there is no relationship between the structure of the board and 
performance of public TVET Institutions in Nyanza region, Kenya”.  The 
independent variable used was the scores from the structure of the board for 
value addition questionnaire computed by using the views of the 
respondents, while dependent variable was performance of TVET scores also 
generated from the views the respondents. Preliminary analyses were 
performed to ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity 
and homoscedasticity. The relationship between perceived structure of board 
and performance of TVET was investigated using Pearson Product-Moment 
correlation coefficient, as shown by Table 4.9 indicating the SSPS output of 
the correlation analysis 
Table 4.3: Correlations between Structure of Board and Performance 
 Structure of board Performance 
Structure of board 
Pearson Correlation 1 .370** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 90 90 
Performance 
Pearson Correlation .370** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 90 90 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Source: Survey Data (2015) 
 
 The results on table 4.9, show that there was a positive correlation 
between the two variables; structure of the board and performance [r= .370, 
p<.05], with high levels of significance. This implies that there is a positive 
association between structure of the board and performance.  This means that 
structure of the board is one of the most important mechanisms of corporate 
governance.  Many studies have tried to understand the influence that the 
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structure of the board have on organizations performance, because its 
presence is fundamental for an organization.  In doing this, the study mainly 
used the agency theory approach which indicates that the board structure is 
usually defined according to the following characteristics: size and 
composition, board independence and director competency and experience 
(Bachiller et al., 2014). The  findings in this study are consistent with 
previous studies (Kiel and Nicholson 2003; Raheja, 2003).  Alwshah,   
(2009) who used (Tobin’s q),  to observe the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance found  that separation of the roles of CEO and 
COB, and CEO membership in the board have positive impact on corporate 
performance. Coles et al (2008) also showed that the structure of the board 
had a positive relationship on performance in complex organizations, as a 
higher number of directors corresponded to a higher level of company 
performance. Likewise, Bozec and Dia (2007) supported this positive 
correlation, arguing that the structure of the board can help a company to 
reduce environmental uncertainties through their different professional 
qualities. On the contrary, Wei Wu (2009) found no significant associations 
between the proportion of independent directors in the board and firm 
performance using quantitative approach.  Ghabayen (2012) reported that 
board composition has a significant negative relationship. 
 
Conclusion: 
 The research sought to determine the relationship between structure 
of the board and performance of public TVET Institutions in Nyanza region, 
Kenya. Mean and standard deviation was used to establish this. Respondents 
reported a high means on the items used to measure structure of the board.  
Restricted terms of reference scored the highest mean (mean=2.51, standard 
deviation=1.173 and standard error =.124). This implies that most of the 
respondents believed that a board with relevant committees has appropriate 
competencies to enable it discharge its mandate effectively. On the other 
hand, the item with least mean was whether the roles of chairperson of board 
and chief executive officer were separated and held by different persons, at 
mean=2.00, standard deviation =. 960 and standard error =.101. The results 
show that there was a strong, positive correlation between the two variable; 
structure of the board and performance. [r= .370, n=90, p<.05].  The 
alternative hypothesis for the objective was confirmed 
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